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The Disappearing Gender Gap: 
The Impact of Divorce, Wages, and Preferences on 
Education Choices and Women’s Work
* 
 
Women born in 1935 went to college significantly less than their male counterparts and 
married women’s labor force participation (LFP) averaged 40% between the ages of thirty 
and forty. The cohort born twenty years later behaved very differently. The education gender 
gap was eliminated and married women’s LFP averaged 70% over the same ages. In order 
to evaluate the quantitative contributions of the many significant changes in the economic 
environment, family structure, and social norms that occurred over this period, this paper 
develops a dynamic life-cycle model calibrated to data relevant to the 1935 cohort. We find 
that the higher probability of divorce and the changes in wage structure faced by the 1955 
cohort are each able to explain, in isolation, a large proportion (about 60%) of the observed 
changes in female LFP. After combining all economic and family structure changes, we find 
that a simple change in preferences towards work can account for the remaining change in 
LFP. To eliminate the education gender gap requires, on the other hand, for the psychic cost 
of obtaining higher education to change asymmetrically for women versus men. 
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A white woman born in the US in 1935 experienced a very dierent work and education trajectory
than her male counterpart. In this cohort, 29% of women went on to college and, once they married,
only 40% worked on average during the ages of thirty to forty. Men, on the other hand, essentially
always worked and over a third more of them (39%) went to college. This gender gap in work and
education was dramatically reduced for the cohort that followed twenty years later. For the cohort born
in 1955, the same proportion of white women and men attended college (44%) and women's labor force
participation increased such that 70% of married women worked on average between the ages of thirty
to forty. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the percentage point increase in both education (college) and
married women's labor force participation (LFP) in the time interval separating these two cohorts was
the largest witnessed over any other twenty year period in US history. Furthermore, as shown in gure
3, the changes in married women's LFP occurred at all stages of their life cycle and these changes were
signicantly larger than those experienced by the cohorts born either 10 years earlier or later.
A search for candidates capable of explaining why these women's lives were transformed yields an
embarrassment of riches. This is a period that witnessed profound changes in the economy, in family
structure, and in social norms. During this period the skill premium increased, the gender wage
gap fell, and there is evidence that the returns to experience increased, childcare costs fell, and that
technological change occurred both in the household and in the workplace. At the family level there
were also important transformations: fertility dropped, people married later and more assortatively, and
the probability of a marriage ending in divorce more than doubled. At the cultural level, expectations
about women's role changed dramatically: June Cleaver gave way to Madonna's material girl.1 Opinion
polls clearly demonstrate the change in popular opinion towards working women. For example, the
proportion of individuals who approved of a wife working if her husband was capable of supporting her
went from 17% in 1945 to 63% in 1970.2
In theory, any of the above-cited changes could have played an important role in transforming
women's lives. The goal of this paper is thus to examine the quantitative contributions of some of
these basic forces to the changes in female LFP and education across these two cohorts. In choosing
which drivers to focus on, we were particularly interested in the role of divorce. This interest comes
from noting two important facts. First, as shown in Figure 4, the 1955 cohort had the highest divorce
1June Cleaver { a principal character in the sitcom \Leave it to Beaver" { was the archetypal housewife.
2Source: Gallup Poll Data (1945, 1970).
1probabilities of any other cohort and continued a trend of high divorce rates that had started ten years
later.3 Hence, it is plausible to argue that women and men in the 1955 cohort anticipated high divorce
rates and changed their behavior accordingly.4
Second, today's women have overtaken men in educational attainment not only in the US, but also
in almost all OECD countries.5 The cross-country nature of the twin phenomena of women's rapidly
increasing LFP and the reversing of the education gender gap points towards drivers of change that
operate across many societies and incentivate women more than men.6 Divorce is indeed such a force.7
The overwhelming tendency for children to live with their mothers and the fact that monetary transfers
from ex-husbands are relatively small leaves women signicantly worse o than their husbands when they
divorce. This would increase women's incentive to work and operate asymmetrically on each gender's
desire to obtain more education. Furthermore, the large increase in divorce rates all over the developed
world would make this force ubiquitous.8 While other drivers such as increased skill premia have also
operated in many countries, there is no evidence that these are consistently higher for women than
for men.9 A proper quantitative analysis nonetheless requires incorporating all potentially signicant
drivers of education and work choices.
In order to investigate the quantitative signicance of economic and social change on the education
gap between men and women and on female LFP, we develop a dynamic life-cycle model and calibrate
it using data for the cohort born in 1935. In the multi-period model, agents that dier by gender and
ability levels make education decisions, enter marriage markets and, in their working stage of life, make
labor, consumption, and savings decisions. They are subject to income, marital, and fertility shocks,
all conditional on gender and education (as in the data), until retirement whereupon they simply make
consumption and savings decisions. Women's disutility of working is allowed to depend on marital
status and on the ages of children in the household. These disutilities will be used to match women's
3Figure 4 plots the cumulative probability of a marriage ending in divorce as a function of the number of years married
for couples who initially married in a given decade. As seen in the gure, the failure rate by a given anniversary year of
marriage is highest for marriages initiated in the 1975-'84 decade, which is when most of the 1955 cohort married.
4This would be less convincing for the cohort born ten years earlier and also had high divorce rates.
5Mexico, Turkey and Switzerland are the exceptions.
6Indeed, as remarked upon by Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko (2006), \any explanation of how U.S. women have caught
up and surpassed men in college trends should be consistent with this common pattern of international changes."
7Divorce has been shown to matter for a variety of outcomes: asset accumulation (Cubeddu and R os-Rull (2003) and
Voena (2010)), the gender gap in voting preferences (Edlund and Pande (2002)), female suicide and domestic violence
(Stevenson and Wolfers (2006)), and fertility timing (Caucutt, Guner, and Knowles (2002)).
8For example, Kneip and Bauer (2009) show that the divorce rate quadrupled on average for Western European countries
between 1960 and 2000.
9Across 21 OECD countries, for example, 8 have higher skill premia for women whereas the other 13 have higher skill
premia for men (see Strauss and de la Maisonneuve (2009)).
2LFP by age, education, and marital status. Although much of our focus is on the LFP of married
women, we also target the LFP of divorced women since their welfare is relevant to women's education
and labor market decisions.
We nd that both changes in family and wage structure had signicant eects on the LFP of married
women. Each of these changes alone can account for about 60% of the change in LFP observed between
our two cohorts of married college women.10 These changes account for a smaller proportion of the
LFP gap for high-school women (48.3% due to wages and 34.2% due to family). We nd that a simple
and relatively small change in preferences is able to explain the remaining LFP gap.
Our paper contributes to the literature on education choice and female LFP. While there is a vast
literature on schooling decisions, there are very few papers that have investigated why women caught up
and then surpassed men in their educational achievement.11 A primarily theoretical paper by Chiappori,
Iyigun, and Weiss (2009) argues that an increased skill premia coupled with the marriage market can
motivate an asymmetric reaction in women's versus men's education decisions. Closer to our work
in the sense of using a quantitative model, Ge (2011) uses NLSY79 data to structurally estimate a
model with endogenous education, female LFP, and marital choices but with no savings-consumption
decisions in a setting with a linear utility function. She nds that the marriage market returns (in
the form of a higher-earning husband) are an important part of the overall returns to acquiring higher
education. There is no analysis, however, of the quantitative signicance of marital instability (divorce)
on education and women's work decisions in part because her analysis is based only on one cohort.
Studying a much longer time period but without a theoretical model, Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko
(2006) conduct an insightful study into the historical evolution of women's versus men's education.
They argue that relatively larger economic benets from college for women coupled with lower psychic
education costs than men (e.g. through better preparedness in high school) were the main contributors
to this phenomenon.
With respect to work, there is a large and growing literature that examines why women's LFP
has changed over dierent time periods.12 A recent paper by Eckstein and Lifshitz (2011) provides
10Note that the eects of changes are not additive.
11Some key papers on the drivers of education choices include, for example, Cameron and Heckman (1998), Cameron and
Heckman (2001), and Cameron and Taber (2004). This literature nds that ability and family background explain a large
part of education decisions. Notable papers which also look at the education decisions of women include Keane and Wolpin
(1997), Keane and Wolpin (2010), and Eckstein and Wolpin (1999). All these papers, however, use the NLSY79 sample,
and thus conduct an analysis over only one cohort.
12The classic source for an economic history of female labor force participation is Goldin (1990). A more recent overview
is given by Costa (2000). Most explanations emphasize technological change in the home or workplace (e.g., Galor and
3an excellent review of this literature. Their paper, like ours, seeks to provide an explanation of the
changing behavior across cohorts of women. They conclude that education and wage changes are largely
responsible for the observed evolution of LFP across several cohorts born between 1925 and 1975 and
that marital status changes played a small role. Like us, the authors use a dynamic life-cycle model to
estimate the contributions of various drivers but, in order to estimate their model, they assume a linear
utility function.13 Our paper, on the other hand, not only endogenizes the schooling decisions of men
as well as women but also employs a non-linear utility function. The latter may be key to a proper
evaluation of the quantitative importance of the increased risk of divorce.
A notable paper that likewise employs a life-cycle model with concave utility to study women's
choices across several cohorts is Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008). Their focus is primarily
on the role of changing childcare costs on women's LFP, a factor that our model will also consider. The
authors nd that a combination of increased female wages and decreased childcare costs is necessary in
order to explain the change in LFP of married women between the 1945 and 1955 birth cohorts. Their
paper, however, assumes that all women are married and thus the authors are unable to evaluate the
contribution of changes in divorce rates to women's work.
Our paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the basic statistics for our two cohorts,
1935 and 1955. Section 3 develops the dynamic stochastic life-cycle model and section 4 discusses
its parametrization. Section 5 presents key features of the benchmark model calibrated to 1935 data.
Section 6 investigates the eects of changes in family structure, wage structure, and the possible role of
changes in culture in generating the education and female LFP outcomes. It also examines the welfare
consequences of these changes. Section 7 shows the results of some robustness checks and section 8
concludes.
2 The Lives of Two Cohorts: 1935 and 1955
In this section we present some key features of the environment faced by our two cohorts. To do this,
we mainly use the 1962-2010 waves of the March supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS), a
Weil (1996), Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005), Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008)), or changes in
medical/contraceptive technology (e.g., Goldin and Katz (2002), Albanesi and Olivetti (2009a,b), and Knowles (2007a)).
Other explanations emphasize changes in wage structure (e.g., Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003), Gayle and Golan
(2010) and Knowles (2007b)) and changes in culture (Fern andez (2011)).
13This linearity, however, has the benet of a large reduction in computational time making feasible a structural
estimation. The presence of concavity, borrowing and savings, and heterogeneity in our model greatly increases the
necessary time for each iteration, rendering estimation too burdensome.
4cross-sectional survey conducted by the Bureau of the Census. Although this is not a panel, we choose
this dataset due to its long time span which allows us to observe the full life span of our cohorts. We
construct synthetic cohorts from the cross-sectional data. Our \1935" cohort consists of white men
and women born between 1934-1936, while our \1955" are those born between 1954-1956.14 Note that
although our sample is selected based on race, we do not restrict the race of the spouses of the people
in our sample. Married people are dened as those \married, with spouse present", singles are those
people who report \never married" while divorced people are those who report their marital status to
be either \divorced" or \separated". Finally, since longevity is deterministic in our model we exclude
widows from our sample.
2.1 LFP and Education
The labor supply of our two cohorts are markedly dierent at all ages. Figure 5 shows LFP rates for each
cohort, by age and education for married and divorced women separately.15 There are several things to
note. First, divorced women (dashed lines) always worked more than their married counterparts (solid
lines) at every age, and for both education levels. These LFP dierences across marital status, however,
are much smaller for the 1955 cohort. Second, college women (circles) work more than high school
women (triangles) throughout most of their lives for both cohorts. It is interesting to note, however,
that while the dierence in LFP across education groups is very small for the 1935 cohort during the
rst ten years in the gure { corresponding to the ages at which women tend to have young children {
this gap increases markedly for the 1955 cohort.16 This is also the period of life in which the largest
increase in LFP (over 100%) occurred between the two cohorts. While married women from the 1935
cohort had strikingly low LFP rates during youth (34.6% for college and 26.4% for high school at in the
ages of 25-29), the young married women in 1955 cohort have LFP rates of 70.4% for college and 54.9%
for high school. The LFP of divorced women in 1955 is also higher than that of their 1935 counterparts.
The increase in LFP is largest at youth, but smaller than the increase seen for married women.
Both men and women increased their education during this time period. The increase for women
was almost triple that of men. For the 1935 cohort, 39.2% of the men had some college whereas only
14We choose to focus on whites as the historical experiences of black men and women have been very dierent. In
particular, black women have worked signicantly more than white women throughout. See Potamites (2007).
15The LFP for each age is calculated using data constructed for the two synthetic cohorts from the CPS.
16Note that this is not driven by the working behavior of women with children. These large increases in LFP occurred
for all groups of married women, both with and without young children.
529.1% of women did { a 10 percentage point gap. For the 1955 cohort, the gap disappeared: 44.5% of
men went to college compared to 43.7% of the women.17
2.2 Marriage Market and Fertility
The divorce probabilities faced by each cohort also changed signicantly. Table 1 reports, by gender
and education, the proportion of marriages that ended in divorce before their twentieth year.18 Note
that divorce probabilities more than doubled for women and increased by around 70-80 percent for men.
Remarriage probabilities stayed fairly constant. It is interesting to note that while women do not show
large dierences in divorce probabilities by education, college men are less likely to divorce (and more
likely to remarry) than their high-school counterparts for both cohorts.
The assortativeness of marriage increased slightly between the two cohorts. The correlation of
spouses in years of education increased for women from 0.61 to 0.64 over these twenty years; for men
the increase was a bit smaller { from 0.63 to 0.64.19 An important indicator of the returns to education
in the marital market is the probability of marrying a college spouse, which increased for both men and
women of both education levels. These proportions are reported by gender and education, in Table 2.
Fertility also changed markedly during this period. Using Census data, women from the 1935 cohort
on average had 3.0 children. This statistic diers by education level with college women having, on
average, 2.5 children and high school women, 3.2 children. For the 1955 cohort the family size was
much smaller: 1.9 children. Again, college women had on average fewer children than their high school
counterparts (1.7 versus 2.1). The median age at rst birth for the 1935 cohort was 22 for high school
women versus 24 for college women. For the cohort born 20 years later, the median age at rst birth
is not very dierent: it decreased for high school women (age 21) and increased for college women (age
25).
2.3 Wages
The skill premium and the gender wage ratio also changed for our two cohorts. The average ratio of
college to high school lifetime hourly wages went from 1.42 for men in the 1935 cohort to 1.54 in the 1955
17Education attainment here is measured at age 30.
18Note that in Table 1 we report the divorce and remarriage frequencies for the birth cohort. This is preferable to the
marriage cohorts used in Figure 4. We thank Betsey Stevenson for kindly making the SIPP data and the code she used
available to us.
19Assortativeness data is computed from CPS, for people aged 35-39.
6cohort. For women, the corresponding averages are 1.38 in the 1935 cohort and 1.50 in the 1955 cohort.
Thus both sexes saw an increase of some 8% across cohorts. Women's wages also gained ground with
respect to those of men. The average ratio of female to male lifetime hourly wages increased from 0.61
for the 1935 cohort to 0.72 in the 1955 cohort.20
3 The Model
In this section, we will rst outline some concerns with the assumptions employed in the model, then
we proceed to explain in detail the economic environment and the household's decision problems.
3.1 Modeling Considerations
We choose a life-cycle model since one of our main variables of interest { female LFP { has a critical
life-cycle component. We allow for endogenous consumption and savings decisions and concave utility
(unlike others, e.g., Eckstein and Lifshitz (2011) and van der Klaauw (1996)) particularly because we
are interested in the importance of the increased risk posed by divorce. To the extent that households
can save, they may be able to buer this and other risks; ignoring this possibility may quantitatively
aect the incentives to work or acquire higher levels of education, particularly for women.
An important question we faced was whether to model an equilibrium marriage market with endogenous
marriage/divorce decisions. We chose not to do so for two key reasons. First, in the data, a signicant
portion of any cohort marries outside its own cohort. For example, for the 1955 cohort, by the age
of 25-29 around 69% of women were married whereas only 60% of men. Hence one cannot assume
the existence of a simple marriage market which clears in equilibrium by having an equal number of
women marry an equal number of men from the same cohort. An alternative would have been to use
an overlapping generations structure and solve for its steady-state equilibrium. The data preceding the
1935 cohort and following the 1955 cohort, however, clearly indicates that neither cohort was inhabiting
a stationary environment. This is evident in both of our education and female LFP gures depicting
the evolution of these variables (see gures 1 and 2) which show a signicant upward trend throughout
the twentieth century. Thus, the non-stationary features of the data strongly contradict the assumption
of a stationary equilibrium. Solving a non-stationary model requires keeping track of the evolution of
the distribution of assets, by gender and education, of divorced people as this aects agents' expected
20Wages are calculated from CPS data. See the Appendix for further details.
7utility of divorce and doing this is beyond our computational capacity.21
Even in the absence of a general equilibrium marriage market, one could still opt to keep marriage
and divorce decisions endogenous. In order to do this one would need to make assumptions about the
distribution of characteristics of prospective spouses in the marriage market (namely, their assets, income,
ability, etc) as these aect the payos of marriage/divorce. Given the absence of data concerning these
distributions for the 1935 cohort, we prefer the transparent and straightforward alternative of modeling
marriage and divorce as exogenous shocks and of assuming that the characteristics of agents' (future)
spouses are given by a latent marital type.22
In particular, our simplifying assumption throughout is that agents are of a given type in terms
of their potential marital partner, that is revealed to them once they've made their education decision.
Prior to making their education choice they know only the conditional probability with which they'll meet
dierent education and ability types, which is a function solely of their gender and education. Afterwards
although they continue to face uncertainty about their marital status, they know the characteristics
(ability, education, current income and experience) of their potential partner. This is their marital
\type". This assumption allows agents to predict the evolution of the asset position of their potential
future spouse, radically reducing the computational burden at the cost of decreasing the uncertainty
individuals face.23
Our model incorporates various sources of heterogeneity in addition to gender. Most importantly
from the perspective of education choice, we allow individuals to dier in their ability. Ability aects
wages dierentially by education and thus inuences education choices. While wages are not determined
entirely within the model in the sense that there are no general equilibrium considerations (e.g. supply
and demand), they are nonetheless endogenous to the individual. Wages are a function of the individual's
exogenous attributes (gender and ability) and also endogenous choices such as education and experience
and thus need to be solved within the model. This is especially important for women since it recognizes
that observed wages are a result of selection that operates both in work decisions made that period and
21Note that we cannot reduce the distribution of assets to a few state variables as is done, for example, in Krusell and
Smith (1998) or Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2010).
22Treating divorce as exogenous is problematic in terms of understanding causality but we are fortunate that in our time
period there were important legal changes, exogenous to the individual, that aected the risk of divorce. In particular,
the introduction of unilateral divorce law signicantly increased the risk of divorce since it was no longer necessary to
obtain consent from one's spouse in order to divorce. In addition, the social stigma associated with divorce decreased also
contributing to increased divorce risk. See Stevenson (2008) for evidence of a positive relationship between the introduction
of unilateral divorce laws and female LFP.
23An alternative possibility would be to assume that remarriage is to an agent with the same asset holdings as one's own,
as in Voena (2010). Our specication has the advantage of respecting gender dierences in asset accumulation behaviors.
8also in the past in the form of accumulated experience.
3.2 Some Preliminaries
Agents are born either male m or female f and with an ability endowment  and an initial asset
position a0 both of which are iid draws from genderless distributions. An individual's life cycle can be
divided into three distinct stages of life. In the rst stage (the education/spousal-allocation stage), the
individual attends school and decides whether to acquire a higher education. That done, the individual
gets matched in a education-dependent marriage market. The agent emerges from that initial marriage
market belonging to one of three possible households with marital status s: married (m), divorced (d)
or single (s) and with their marital type revealed. Next, the individual enters the second stage of life
(the working stage), in which they receive fertility shocks, wage draws and martial shocks, and make
consumption-savings and female labor force participation decisions. Lastly, in the third stage of life (the
retirement stage), individuals no longer work nor suer shocks to their marital status. Their retirement
income is deterministic; they make consumption and savings decisions under certainty.
Preferences, Consumption, and Borrowing Constraints
The instantaneous utility function of an agent with gender g and education level e (with marital status







where c is consumption and Pt denotes the labor force participation decision, taking the value one if
the agent works and zero otherwise. We will henceforth assume that only women suer disutility from
market work,  s
eg(kt), that may depend on education, marital status, and the vector kt indicating the
ages of her children in that period. We normalize men's and single women's work disutility to zero
and thus assume that they always work (accordingly, we will not match any empirical LFP moments for
them).
Household consumption can be thought of as a public good with congestion. If the household spends





units of household consumption. Thus e(kt;s) gives the economies of scale that exist which depend on
9the ages and number of children and whether there are one or two adults in the household (hence the
s).24
Agents' borrowing is only constrained by the no-bankruptcy condition aT+1  0 which imposes
that agents must pay o all their debt before they die. Our choice of a utility function with innite
marginal utility of consumption at zero consumption will ensure that the agent is bounded away from
the constraint.
Divorce, Remarriage, and Children
Women obtain marital-dependent fertility shocks at the beginning of a period. In keeping with modeling
one of the major asymmetries between the sexes, we assume that when a couple divorces the children
stay with the mother. We use k
ij
t to denote a vector that keeps track of the age of each child that
woman i had with husband j. If a woman divorces, both she and her ex-husband continue to share the
same kij variable until they remarry. Note that if there are no children, kt  0. Children remain with
the parents/mother until they become adults (at the age of 20 in the model). They make no decisions
but deate household consumption accordingly.
In the advent of divorce, assets are split between the two ex-spouses, with a proportion  of assets
going to the wife and 1    to the husband. Furthermore, we assume that the man pays his ex-wife a
proportion of his income as child support as long as she remains both unmarried and with a child under
20. Agents are assumed to remain divorced for at least one model period, i.e. they cannot receive a
remarriage and a divorce shock at the same time.
Recall that given our previous assumption, agents know the characteristics of their potential spouse.
For computational ease we assume also that when a divorced agent remarries, so does their ex spouse.
To further simplify matters, upon remarriage each is assumed to marry an agent whose characteristics
are the same as those of their ex spouse (in terms of education, ability, fertility, experience, and income
shock). Thus, we simply reassign the children to the newly remarried couple. Finally, if the wife does
not remarry by the time she enters retirement, she receives a proportion of her husband's retirement
benets.
24As explained in the parameterization section, we use an altered McClements scale whose exact specication is outlined
in the Appendix.
10Income
In each period of the work stage of life, individuals receive wage draws and then decide whether to work.
The income process is uncertain. It has an idiosyncratic persistent (zt) and a transitory component
(t), and is a gender and education-specic function of experience (xt) and ability () that takes into
account the human capital depreciation that occurs if the agent did not work the prior period, i.e.,
yegt = yeg(;xt;zt;Pt 1).
In each period during retirement, an individual receives retirement income bs
g (y) that is a function
of gender, past earnings, and marital status.
3.3 The Education and Initial Marital Status Stage
In the initial stage, period 0, an individual goes to school and decides whether to obtain more education
given her ability . The level of education is a discrete choice with two possible outcomes denoted by
e 2 fl;hg, h > l.25 If an agent chooses to obtain more education, the education outcome is h; otherwise
it is l. In this initial period there are no consumption, saving, or work decisions.
Obtaining education level h is costly. An individual i is assumed to suer disutility !i from obtaining
higher education, where !i is a draw from a distribution Cg(!) that potentially diers by gender g,
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eg; t0 () is the expected value of the agent's welfare at the beginning of period zero (denoted  t0)
given ability level , sex g, and education level e.26 Expectations here are taken both with respect to
the household type s that the individual will draw at the end of this initial period, given her education
decision, as well as with respect to all subsequent education-specic shocks to income, marital status,
and fertility.
After completing education, individuals enter the marriage market where they face an exogenous,
education-and-gender-specic probability vector peg;t0 (s) of obtaining a given marital status s. An
individual emerges from the marriage market either married (m), divorced (d); or still single (s), i.e.,
25In the data l will be high-school graduates and below and h will be individuals who have more education than a
high-school diploma.
26Henceforth, we use  t to denote the value of a variable before the realizations of the end-of-period shocks.
11s 2 fm;d;sg and with knowledge of her/his potential-spouse type.27
3.4 The Work Stage
Individuals are assumed to spend periods 1 until period tR in this stage. In each period, every individual
receives an education-and-gender-specic wage draw that is a function of the individual's history, in
particular her/his work experience and past wage draws. Given these draws, households make both
consumption-savings and work decisions. How these decisions are made diers by marital status.
Singles and divorced individuals make these decisions to maximize their life-time utility. For married
individuals, on the other hand, household consumption and the wife's labor force participation are
chosen, as in Chiappori (1988), so as to maximize the weighted sum of the spouses' lifetime utilities.28
Thus we are assuming that the household allocation is Pareto ecient.29
Households are also subject to fertility shocks at the beginning of each period and marital shocks at
the end of each period. Asset, consumption and participation choices are made after fertility shocks
and income are observed but prior to the realization of the marital shock. Households get divorced with
probability deg;t, divorced individuals remarry with probability reg;t, and singles marry with probability
meg;t. Women receive fertility shocks est that dier by education and marital status. A time line
showing periods 0 and 1 of an individual's life is given in Figure 6 to clearly illustrate the timing of
shocks and decisions.
Budget constraints while working:
Married individuals:
If married in period t, a household makes its consumption and savings decisions subject to a household
budget constraint knowing that at the end of the period its marital status may change as a result of a
shock. The married household's budget constraint is given by:
^ ct (kt) + am
t+1 = Ram
t + (yeft   (kt))Pt + yemt (4)
27A divorced individual is one who was married at some point and then divorced during this initial period. In the data
this will be prior to the age of 30.
28A husband's labor force participation could also be an outcome but since we assume his disutility of working is zero,
he will always work
29See Del Boca and Flinn (2010) for an insightful analysis of various modeling approaches one may use to determine
household allocations.
12where am
t is the married household asset holdings entering period t. Income consists of capital income
from last period's asset, where R is the gross return, and yegt is each spouses' labor market income
from which expenditures on childcare, (kt), are subtracted if a woman works. ^ c is the expenditure on
consumption and am
t+1 is the household's asset position before the realization of the marital shock at the
end of period t. At the end of a period t, shocks to marital status may leave the household divorced,
which then aects their asset holdings. We assume that a fraction  2 (0;1) of the assets am
 t+1 are






> > > <
> > > :
am
t+1 = am
t+1 if st+1 = m, g = m;f (i.e. the couple enters t + 1 still married)
ad
f;t+1 = am
t+1 if st+1 = d; g = f
ad
m;t+1 = (1   )am
t+1 if st+1 = d, g = m
(5)
Divorced individuals:
In addition to the reallocation of marital assets right after divorce, we assume that husbands must
also make transfer payments to wives in subsequent periods if they have children. In particular, the
former husband must pay some fraction of his current income to his ex-wife as child support h(kt;ymt)
as long as the child is not an adult.30 Recalling that the children reside with their mother, the budget
constraint of a divorced woman at time t is given by:
^ ct (kt) + ad
f;t+1 = Rad
ft + (yft   (kt))Pt + h(kt;ymt) (6)
whereas that of a divorced man is:
ct + ad
m;t+1 = Rad
mt + ymt   h(kt;ymt) (7)
where ad
t+1 is the asset position prior to the realization of the marital shock at the end of period t. Note
that a divorced man's consumption equals his expenditure on consumption (since his household consists
only of himself).
At the end of period t, the shock to marital status can transit a divorced individual into remarriage.
30In the model, as long as his child is below the age of twenty.
13Thus, a divorced individual i that had saved ad
i;t+1 faces at the end of period t the following law of




> > > <
> > > :
ad
i;t+1 = ad




j;t+1 if st+1 = m (i.e., if i enters t + 1 remarried to j) (8)
Singles:
Single women and men are assumed to always work. Their budget constraint diers only if the
woman has a child (whereupon she must pay childcare). Thus, for a single woman
^ ct(kt) + as
t+1 = Ras
t + yft   (kt) (9)
whereas for a single man:
ct + as
t+1 = Ras
t + ymt (10)
At the end of a period t, shocks to marital status can transit a single individual i into marriage, whereupon












j;t+1 if st+1 = m (i.e., if i enters t + 1 married to j)
(11)
3.5 Retirement
In periods tR through T all individuals are retired and hence do not work. They still make a
consumption-savings decision each period that depends on household type and receive a pension bs
g (y)
that depends on own past earnings history y, gender, and present household type s. In particular,
divorced men may be required to transfer some of their pension to their ex-wife. There are no longer
any child support payments at this stage and all individuals are assumed to die at the end of period T.
31Recall that a divorced agent is marrying another divorced agent by assumption, hence i and j both have d superscripts
in equation (8)
32We assume that singles marry other singles.
14Recall that we assume that individuals cannot die with debt. Thus the budget constraints are given by:







In this section we outline each household type's optimization problem. Before doing so we introduce
individual i's state vector 
it = fait;xi;t 1;Pi;t 1;kt;zit;ei;i;itg. The state variable keeps track of an
individual's assets, experience (for a man, his age, whereas for a woman how many periods she worked
in the past), whether i worked last period, the number and ages of children, the permanent component
of the income shock, an individual's education and ability, and one's marital type, it. In addition to
an agent's potential (or actual or ex) spouse's permanent characteristics (ability and education), it also
tracks the evolution of the spouse's asset holdings, experience, participation, and permanent income
shock, all as of period t.
Divorced agent's problem:
We now characterize the value of being divorced. Upon retirement, the optimization problem is simple











t) for t  tR
s:t: retired divorced budget constraint for g in eq. (12)
During the work phase of life, the divorcee has an exogenous education and gender dependent probability
of remarrying reg. Upon remarriage, the maximization problem faced by that individual corresponds
to that of a married household's. In any given period t < tR   1, the divorcee chooses consumption,
saving, and, if she's a woman, whether or not to work.33 Thus, the value of being a divorced woman at
33Note that the problem at time t = t
R   1 is slightly dierent since the continuation value is given by the solution to
the retirement stage problem.

























s:t: divorced female budget constraint (6) and asset law of motion (8) (13)
and xt+1 = xt + Pt
where the expectation is taken over future shocks to her income, fertility, and her potential marital
partner's income as well as possible future marital status shocks.
The divorced man's problem is identical to that of the divorced female except that there is no
participation choice and the budget constraint and value functions are appropriately modied. The

























s:t: divorced male budget constraint (7) and asset law of motion (8)
Married Household's Problem













s:t: retired married budget constraint (12) and asset law of motion (5)
for all t  tR. This is relatively simple problem because, in the absence of marital shocks and labor
decisions, the spouses agree on the optimal allocation unlike during the working period.












































s:t: the budget constraint for married couples (4) and asset law of motion (5)
and xt+1 = xt + Pt
where  denotes the Pareto weight of the wife. Note that 
f;t+1 and 
m;t+1 are the state variables of
the wife and husband, respectively.35
We use an asterisk to denote the resulting outcomes from the optimization problem above. Thus,































































t) for t  tR (19)
s:t: retired single budget constraint (12) and asset law of motion (11)
34As before, that the problem at time t = t
R   1 is slightly dierent since the continuation value is given by the solution
to the retirement stage problem.
35Note that we are slightly abusing notation by using 
t as the household's state vector. Since both 
ft and 
mt have
the same information, however, this is just a question of formal notation.


























s:t: the budget constraint for singles (9) or (10) and asset law of motion (11)
and xt+1 = xt + Pt
4 Parametrization
In this section we describe the calibration of the model. In order to respect the fact that men and women
marry outside their cohorts we solve the model twice, once with the marriage market probabilities faced
by women and the other with the probabilities faced by men from our 1935 cohort. The statistics
generated by the model therefore are the right ones to compare with the data which are reported by
gender and cohort.37
Some model parameter values are taken from preexisting estimates from the literature, others are
estimated directly from the data using model restrictions. The remaining set of parameters are calibrated
within the model in order to match certain moments in the data. The reasoning guiding dierent choices
is explained below. Table 3 shows the parameters estimated \outside" the model and Tables 4 and 5
displays the \internally" calibrated parameters.
Our key parameters of interest are those that aect work decisions for women and education decisions
for both sexes. These parameters include those which govern disutility from labor and education,
childcare costs and several parameters which aect wage dynamics. We next proceed to explain the
choices of functional form and their calibration in detail.
Demographics and Preferences
The model period is 5 years. Individuals begin the working stage of life at age 25 (period t = 1) where
they remain for 7 periods. Retirement begins in the model period tR = 8 (thus at age 60) and death
occurs at the end of model period T = 12 (at age 85).
36As before, that the problem at time t = t
R   1 is slightly dierent since the continuation value is given by the solution
to the retirement stage problem.
37In other words, we are not reporting what the spouses of our agents do but rather what the women and men of our
cohort do.
18Parametrizing our utility function requires specifying the parameter  governing the coecient of
relative risk aversion, the discount factor , and the disutility from work for various categories of women
(the  s
e (k)). Since most estimates for the relative risk aversion parameter in the literature vary between
one and two, we chose  = 1:5 for our utility function specication. This value is in line with the values
found by Attanasio and Weber (1995) using US consumption data. We set the discount factor  = 0:90
(for a ve year period) which corresponds to a conventional yearly discount factor of 0:98.
The disutility of labor is allowed to vary by marital status, education, and children's age. The
disutilities are calibrated within the model in order to match female labor force participation rates by
marital status and education for the 1935 cohort. The distinction between working as a single woman
versus married or divorced was particularly relevant to the 1935 cohort who grew up thinking of married
women primarily as homemakers (the June Cleaver generation). With respect to children, we distinguish
between mothers with young children (below the age of 5) and those with older children assuming that
only the former bear any additional disutility from working.38 Lastly, these disutilities are allowed to
dier by education, reecting the fact that jobs may have non-monetary rewards (e.g. the distinction
made between a \job" and a \career"). We normalize the disutility of working for single women to zero
(the same as that of all men). The results for the internal calibration of these disutility parameters are
reported in Table 4 and discussed in the benchmark model section.
Education Costs
Parametrizing the cost of education is a challenge. First, given the absence of data on the ability
distribution of individuals with some college relative to the rest of the population for either of our two
cohorts, we assume a psychic cost that is invariant to ability though the monetary reward is not. Second,
although the cost of acquiring a higher education is modeled as a psychic one, it can also be seen as
consisting of both a monetary and psychic component.39 Using data to calibrate the monetary portion
of the cost would not be helpful, however, as it still leaves a free parameter. Given the absence of data,
we choose instead to pin down the cost of a higher education by requiring the model to generate the
correct proportion of individuals attending college by gender. We assume that these (psychic) costs
38Mothers of young children may be especially reluctant to work. See, for example, Bernal (2008) and Bernal and Keane
(2009) for some evidence regarding the eects of mother's working on children's development.
39The computational model shows that individuals are not borrowing constrained and hence they would be able to cover
(reasonable) nancial costs of higher education via borrowing. Doing this correctly, however, requires modifying the budget
constraint to account for the cost of education.
19are a random draw from a gender specic log-normal distribution LN  (g;2). We normalize the
standard deviation for both genders to  = 1 and we internally calibrate f;m to generate the correct
proportions as reported in Table 5. The economic meaning of these parameters is discussed in the
benchmark model section.
Income Process
For an individual of gender g with education level e, her/his wage at time t is given by yeg;t such that:
lnyeg(;xt;zt;Pt 1) = eg;t + eg1xt + eg2x2
t + e ln   (1   Pt 1) + wet (21)
where egt captures a time varying component in aggregate wages, by education and gender, and eg1;eg2
are education and gender specic experience polynomials. e captures the returns to individuals ability
 by education group, and  is the additional human capital depreciation incurred from not working in




The stochastic component to wages we
t is assumed to be the sum of a (observable to the agent)
persistent component (zet) and a transitory component (et):
wet = zet + et (22)
The zet persistent shock is modeled as an AR(1) process
zet = eze;t 1 + et;
et  N(0;e) (23)
while the transitory shock is distributed et  N(0;e). This choice of model for the stochastic process
is standard in the literature and it is consistent with both the sharp drop in the autocovariance function
for wages between lags 0 and 1 and also with the large increase in the variance of wages observed in the
data over the life-cycle.40
40This specication and its estimation is discussed in great detail in, for example, Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004)
and Guvenen (2007), as are the characteristics of the autocovariance functions and the variance growth in the life cycle
which motivate the functional form of the stochastic process.
20In order to estimate this process directly from the data one needs a panel dataset which includes
individual wages across the life-cycle and a measurement of the individual's ability. One way to measure
ability's contribution to wages is to proxy it with an individual's AFQT scores and then estimate how
wages dier by ability and education. Since there is no dataset which reports AFQT scores for either of
our cohorts, we assume that both returns to ability and age polynomials did not change over time and
use the NLSY79 dataset to estimate these parameters.
The NLSY79 is a panel survey of a representative sample of 12,686 American young men and women
who were 14-22 years old when they were rst surveyed in 1979. First, we construct data on hourly
wages (yem;t) for men of education level e using data on earnings and total hours worked.41 We then run
the following regression in order to estimate the parameters ^ em1; ^ em2 of the second degree polynomial
on age and the parameter for returns to ability e:
lnyNLSY
em;t = Dem;t + em1aget + em2age2
t + e lnAFQT + wem;t
where Demt is a set of year dummies and AFQT denotes the agent's AFQT score. We use the residuals
from this regression to estimate the parameters of the stochastic process (;;) using the minimum
distance estimator rst proposed by Chamberlain (1984). This method seeks parameters which minimize
the distance between the empirical covariance matrix of income residuals and the one obtained from
simulating the income process outlined above. This choice of estimator is standard in the literature and
its use and identication in this specic income process is described in detail in, for example, Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron (2004) and Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2010).42
The last step is to compute the time-varying intercepts em;t. Note that we cannot simply recover
these from the year dummies from the previous regression because those do not span the years pertinent
to our two cohorts. Our strategy is to rst-dierence log wages in a panel dataset as this will eliminate
the eect of ability on wages (i.e., they become a xed eect). We choose the PSID to estimate the
time-varying intercepts using rst-dierenced log wages for men by education level. 43 Using data on
41See the Appendix for details of the sample selection.
42We thank Gianluca Violante for kindly providing us with the estimation code.
43The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is the longest panel survey conducted in the US, starting in 1968.
Interviews were conducted on an annual basis until 1997, and from then onwards, biennially. Although we use all the
waves from 1968 to 2009 of the PSID, these years still do not fully span the life-cycles of our two cohorts. Namely, our
1935 cohort was 33 years old in 1968 and our 1955 cohort was 54 years old in 2009. We assume that the wage intercept
for the rst period of the 1935 cohort (ages 25-29) is the same as the one for the second period (ages 30-34), whereas the
last intercept for the 1955 cohort (ages 55-59) is the same as the period before (ages 50-54). As can be seen in the Figures
7 and 8 these are reasonable assumptions.
21earnings and hours worked for white males aged between 25 and 65, we construct a measure of log hourly
wages. We regress
lnyPSID
em;t   [^ em1(aget   aget 1)   ^ em2(age2
t   age2




em;t 1, b em1;b em2; are the estimated values of the age coecients
(from the NLSY) and Dem;t are the dierenced year dummies. To obtain a value for each em we
average the Dem;t values obtained over the 5 years corresponding to the em interval (e.g. em;3 is the
average over Dem;t estimated for the years 1970 to 1974). This strategy requires a value for the initial
year dummy to anchor the sequence. We calibrate the values of these anchors (one for each education
level) internally in the model where they will be used to help match the lifetime skill premium for men
and the rst period gender gap. The time dummies obtained this way are plotted in Figure 7 and 8.
We assume that women share the same returns to ability by education (e) and the same stochastic
wage process (wet) as men. The fact that women move in and out of the labor force implies that we
cannot use the same method as before to estimate experience and time intercepts for women's wage
processes. We calibrated the latter internally so that the model generates the period-by-period gender
wage ratio and skill premia for women as seen in the data. The implied values of ef;t for our benchmark
cohort are plotted in Figure 7. With respect to returns to experience, the literature has found values
in the range of 2 to 5% returns to wages from one year of participation for women born in later cohorts
(1940s onwards). Since there is evidence that the returns to experience has increased over time, we
choose parameters which imply a 2% return to wages from an extra year of participation during the ages
of 25-40 for women in the 1935 cohort.44
Our model abstracts from alimony since the evidence in the data shows that both the proportion of
divorced people who receive it and the monetary amounts are very small.45 Child support is a more
common and substantial payment. For example, Del Boca and Flinn (1995) nd it to be about 20% of
the father's income. The rate of non-compliance, however, is fairly high at 37%. Beller and Graham
44For example, Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008)'s calibrated returns to experience imply a return of about
2% for the cohort of women born around 1945. Olivetti (2006) estimates the return to one year of full time work to be
between 3 and 5% using data in the 1970 Census and she also nds an increase of almost 90% in returns to experience
using the 1990 Census.
45For example, Voena (2010) uses the National Longitudinal Survey of Young and Mature Women to show that only 10%
of divorced women report receiving alimony between 1977 and 1999 and the monetary amounts correspond to only about
15% of the divorced woman's household income. Using 1978 CPS data, Peters (1986) reports alimony payments which
correspond to under 3% of the average male earnings that year.
22(1988) report an average child support payment of $1115 in 1978. Given an average male wage that
year of around $13,000, this amounts to 8.7% of the male wage; these authors also nd a high rate
of non-compliance (over 50%). In the light of this evidence, we assume that as long as his ex-wife has
children under the age of 20, the man pays child support equivalent to 10% of his current income (unless
she remarries). We do robustness checks using other values for this parameter.46
After retirement, for computational simplicity (as in Guvenen (2007)), individuals in our model
receive a constant pension which is a function of her/his last observed earnings. The exact functional
form of the pension system mimics the US Social Security bendpoints (following Heathcote, Storesletten,
and Violante (2010)) and it is outlined in the appendix. Married couples receive either the sum of the
husband's and wife's pensions or 1.5 times the husband's pension (whichever one is higher). A divorced
woman receives, in addition to her own pension, 10% of her ex-husband's pension.47
Family Formation and Fertility
In the model, after agents choose their education level, they receive marital status shocks and then enter
the working stage as married, single or divorced with the proportions found in CPS data for our cohorts
at age 25-29. These proportions are given in Figure 9, and they vary by gender, education, and cohort.
As discussed previously, all agents are assigned a marital \type" that is revealed in period zero after
the agent's choice of education level. That type permanently determines the characteristics of one's
spouse independently of whether the agent enters period 1 as married, single, or divorced. For each
agent, given her/his education, we assign a spousal type so as to match the conditional distribution of
spouses' education as seen in the data for people aged between 35-39 for each respective cohort. These
proportions (conditional upon one's education), are reported in Table 2. Thus, the pattern of marriages
by education mimics the degree of assortativeness found in the data. The ability level of one's spouse is
assumed to be a random draw from the (endogenous) ability levels within the spouse's education group.
The probability of marriage for agents who enter a period single is calculated directly from the
evolution over time of the proportion of people who are never married in the CPS data for the 1935
and 1955 cohorts. These probabilities are reported in Table 6, by age, education and gender. Next
46In our model, we abstract from the risk of non-compliance by the father in the payment of child support by making
these payments certain. Uncertainty in these payments would increase the eects of a higher divorce rate.
47The laws governing an ex-wife's claim to the man's pension have evolved over time. Before 1980 unvested pensions were
not considered part of marital property. Currently, pensions are divided as part of marital property and they are frequently
the most valuable portion of the marital real estate (see Oldham (2008)). In our robustness check we investigated other
proportions as well.
23we need divorce and remarriage rates. The main data set which records individuals' marital histories
is the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) conducted by the Census.48 Ideally one
would keep track of each agent's marriage duration conditional upon year of marriage (age). Doing so,
however, would add signicantly to the computational complexity since it would increase the state space.
Moreover, it is dicult to estimate with precision the probabilities of divorce/remarriage conditional on
both year and duration of marriage/divorce due to small sample size in each year-of-marriage bin for
each of our cohorts. Given these considerations, we choose a simple alternative. Recall that in our
model, the rst period corresponds to the ages of 25-29, the second period, to the ages of 30-34, and so
on. Conditional on gender and education, we compute the proportion of people who begin age 25 as
married but who undergo at least one divorce between the ages of 25-29. This gives us the probabilities
of divorce between periods 1 and 2 in the model. We proceed analogously for the remaining periods,
deriving 4 age-varying divorce probabilities by education and gender. Thus, our model reproduces,
period-by-period, the correct proportion of people who divorced in each age bracket.
For remarriage rates, due to sample size restrictions, we proceed in a dierent way than above.49
We calculate, conditional on gender and education, the proportion of people who remarry before the
twentieth anniversary of their last divorce and assume a uniform remarriage rate over this twenty year
interval.50 The resulting divorce and remarriage rates are reported in Tables 7 and 8.51
Fertility shocks are education and marital status dependent and are calibrated to yield both the
proportion of women who are mothers during the ages of 25-29 for each cohort, by education level and
marital status, and to generate the average number of children a woman has in her lifetime, by education
level, as in the PSID data for each cohort.52 In particular, for the 1935 cohort, single women and college
48The SIPP is a series of short panels (from 2.5 to 4 years) of approximately 14,000 to 36,700 households in the US.
49The number of people in the SIPP who entered ages 25 and 30 as divorced is too small { around 30 for men and 15 for
women { to use the same procedure.
50We augment our birth cohorts by 2 years due to sample size (i.e. the 1935 cohort is dened as all people born between
1933-1937). To calculate the remarriage rate we proceed in the following manner: individuals who divorced after the age
of 30 contribute to the remarriage rate if they remarried within 20 years of their divorce and prior to the age of 60, if not,
they are considered divorced. For those individuals who enter the age of 30 already divorced, the 20 year window in which
to count as \remarried" commences as of age 30. This is the correct procedure since the initial proportion of individuals
across marital states already accounts for divorces and remarriages that took place before the age of 30.
51Recall that we assume that our agents cannot divorce and remarry at the end of the same period and thus they
eectively remain divorced for at least 5 years. Note that the median duration of divorce is 5 years for the 1935 cohort
and 6 years for the 1955 cohort.
52We choose to match the proportion of women (by education and marital status) who are mothers because LFP behavior
is driven more by the presence of a young child at home rather than by the number of children women have. Moreover,
given that our childcare costs and additional disutility from labor depend only on the age of the youngest child in the
household, we chose to focus on the distinction between mothers and others (this is the strategy followed by Attanasio,
Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008)).
24women of all marital status receive a fertility shock in the rst period that takes the value of zero or
one. Divorced women and married high-school women receive a fertility shock that takes the value
of zero or two. The probability of receiving a non-zero value is calibrated so as to match the initial
proportions (age 25-29) in the data by marital status and education as reported in Table 9. In period 2,
divorced and single women are not hit by fertility shocks whereas all women who are married in period
2 are assumed to have an additional child. Lastly, all women who were married in both periods 1
and 2 receive an additional fertility shock in the second period that can take the value of zero or two
for high-school women, and zero or one for college women. The frequency of shocks is calibrated to
generate the following numbers: 2.54 children per college woman, 3.20 for high school women and an
overall average of 3.00 children per woman for the 1935 cohort.53
For the 1955 cohort the structure and values of fertility shocks are the same as those for the 1935
cohort. The frequencies in the initial period are adjusted so as to match the proportions in the data
for the 1955 cohort between the ages of 25-29 as reported in Table 9. In the second period, once
again, no divorced or single women receive any additional children. All women who were not married
in period zero and got married at the end of period one receive a child. Lastly, once again, all women
who were married in both periods are hit by a fertility shock that can take the value of zero or one.54
This generates the following numbers of children over their lifespan: college women have 1.74 children
on average, high school women have 2.11 and, overall there are 1.91 children per woman for the 1955
cohort.
Consumption deator and child care costs
Children are assumed to live with their parents (or mother, if parents are divorced) until the age of 20.
They make no decisions in the household but deate consumption according to their age. We choose
to use the McClements scale to calculate the economies of scale in consumption.55 Its exact numbers
(by child's age) are reported in the Appendix.
53The numbers for average number of children were computed using the PSID by calculating the average number of
children ever born to women from each of our cohorts by the time they reached aged 40. Due to sample size constraints, we
dene the 1935 cohort as women born in 1933-1937 and the 1955 cohort those born in 1953-1957. In order to generate the
correct number of average children, we assign a 98% probability of a non-zero fertility outcome during the second period for
women who have been married for two periods if they have college education and 43% probability if they have high school.
54Once again, to generate the correct number of average children seen in the data, we assign the probabilities of receiving
an extra child during the second period to women who have been married for 2 periods of 73% if they are college and 52%
if they are high school.
55This scale is very similar to the OECD scale, but it has the advantage that it was computed based on expenditure data
from families.
25Women who have children under the age of 10 at home are assumed to incur childcare costs if they
work. These costs are assumed to depend only on the age of the youngest child, i.e. if a household has
a young and an old child, they only incur the childcare cost once, for the younger child. We calibrate
the childcare costs for young children (aged 0-4), young and for old children (aged 5-9), old internally
in the model and their values are reported in Table 5.
Other External Parameters
An important parameter in the model is the Pareto weight on a woman's welfare in the household
allocation problem. There is no real guidance as to what this should be. A recent paper by Voena
(2010), using variations in savings behavior and divorce laws, estimates a value of 0.25. In our benchmark
calibration we set this value, , to 0.3; the robustness section investigates the eect of changing this
weight.
Upon divorce we assume that the woman is responsible for the children and that assets are split
equally between the husband and wife (i.e.,  = 0:5). In the data, at the time when most of the divorces
were occurring for our 1935 cohort, most states either had equitable distribution laws or community
property laws. In the former, asset division is dictated by court of law, which may impose an equal
split or favor either the spouse who contributed more towards the asset or the one who has higher needs.
Under community property law, assets (and debts) are divided equally across the spouses. Thus, an
equal split is a reasonable benchmark. In our robustness section we explore values of  = 0:3 and
 = 0:7 and nd similar quantitative results. Finally, the gross interest rate is set to R = 1:077 which,
in this ve-year-period model corresponds to an annual interest rate of 1.5%. This is the average real
return on a 3 month t-bill over the period of 1935-2008.
To summarize, we have a total of 29 parameters which we calibrated internally: 8 parameters which
govern the disutility of labor for married and divorced women, 2 parameters for childcare costs, 14
time-varying wage-intercept parameters for women and 2 for men, one wage depreciation parameter and
2 education cost parameters. We choose to match a total of 45 statistics for our 1935 cohort: 28 average
LFP rates for married and divorced women, by age and education, 7 time-varying gender wage ratios
and the proportions of men and women who go to college. We also match 7 time-varying skill premia for
women and the average lifetime skill premium for men.56 Although this mapping is only approximate,
56Note that we only target one skill premium statistic for men using em;1;e = fh;lg, since the remainder values are
calculated from rst dierences in the data on male wages.
26it may be useful to think of the time-varying wage-intercept parameters as mainly targeting the skill
premia and gender wage ratio statistics. The education cost parameters help match the proportions of
men and women who go to college, while the remaining parameters are used to match LFP.
5 The 1935 Benchmark
As seen in Figure 10, the benchmark model does an excellent job of reproducing the LFP proles for
both married and divorced women according to their education and also matches the proportions of men
and women who choose to go to college (see Table 5). Furthermore, as shown in Figure 11 the model
is also quite successful at matching the period-by-period gender wage ratio and skill premia for women.
The disutilities of working in various states are reported in Table 4. They are higher, across all
marital-fertility categories, for high-school women than for college women. The ratios of costs across
categories is fairly similar for both education groups.
To make economic sense of the work disutility numbers we can calculate their equivalent consumption
cost. A simple way to translate the cost into consumption units is to calculate the decrease in average
consumption that women would be willing to bear to avoid these costs, i.e., to nd the z such that
u(zcm
fe) = u(cm
fe)    es(k) (24)
where cm
fe is the average per-period consumption of married women with education level e.57 These
proportions (z) are shown in the lower panel of Table 4. The percentage loss in consumption due to
disutility from labor is similar, within each education category, for married and divorced women without
children. It increases markedly for women with children, particularly for married high-school women
as these have very low LFP rates, requiring the model to generate a large disutility number in order to
\explain" this. Note from gure 5 that fewer than 35% of high-school women are working during the
ages of 25-34 despite the fact that their consumption is lower than their college counterparts' who have,
on average, higher-earning husbands.
The calibrated childcare costs for a young child correspond to around 68.8% of average per-period
female wages, and those of an older child are 24.0%. We can compare these values to those obtained by
57To calculate c
M
fe we nd the average consumption of married women of education e in each period and then average
across periods. We choose to express all percentages in terms of married women's average consumption as the pool of
divorced women is constantly changing.
27Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008). In their calibrated model they nd that childcare costs
are 66% of a woman's mean earnings.58
The mean of the (lognormal distribution) of education costs are similar for men and women, though
somewhat lower for the latter. This reects the nding that, for all ability levels, the ex-ante welfare
gap between college and high school is larger for men than it is for women. Why is this the case?
This is mostly due to a slightly higher skill premium for men combined with the fact that they work
considerably more than women rendering this skill premium more important. Recall that in our model
men (and single women) are assumed to always work whereas women's average LFP over their lifetime
is only 53.3%.
Turning next to education (college) costs, since these are incurred only once it is easier to interpret
their economic signicance by solving for their equivalent cost in terms of the average per-period








fh;t)   !g (25)
where !g is the average cost of higher education (by gender) implied by the calibrated parameter g
and cm
fh;t is the average consumption of married college women at time t. Using this metric, women's
education costs correspond, on average, to a 16.5% decrease in per-period consumption, whereas the
consumption reduction implied by the average cost of higher education for men is 18.2%.60 Note that
it is possible to think of this psychic cost as having a monetary component (tuition and foregone wages)
in addition to a purely psychic component. This would simplify the interpretation of their magnitudes
but would require us to introduce an additional borrowing decision in period zero. Thus producing a
monetary plus psychic estimate is not an immediate calculation and would still leave (as in Gallipoli,
Meghir, and Violante (2010)) a free psychic component to interpret.
58This number is reported in terms of the mean earnings of a thirty-year-old woman who worked continuously prior to
childbirth.
59We choose to express the education costs in terms of a xed consumption category (married college women) since the
shape of preferences imply that the consumption equivalence of a xed cost C is increasing in consumption, i.e., the z that
solves u(zc) = u(c)   C is an increasing function of c.
60An alternative is to consider the average cost incurred by those who actually choose higher education. Computing zg
yields an equivalence of 11.9% of consumption for women and 14.1% of consumption for men.
28Some Implications of the Calibrated Model
The model generates statistics which were not directly targeted in the calibration and thus provide
additional checks of the model. Recall that we did not directly target the LFP of women with children
and thus a comparison with the data is informative. Due to the CPS data's lack of information regarding
the presence of young children in the household for our time period, we instead use Census data. Using
the 1960 and 1970 Census, we can observe the cohort at the age of 25 and 35, respectively, and obtain
an average LFP rate across those years of 28.5% for women with children under the age of 10.61 The
analogous statistic in our model would be the LFP of women with children under 10 during the rst
three periods of life.62 This yields an LFP of 26.9%, i.e. very close to the data. The LFP for women
without children under 10 during this same time period is 63.8% in the data versus 64.7% in the model.
Next, it may be useful to report college attendance by aptitude level and gender (see Table 10).
Although we do not have data relevant to the 1935 cohort with which to compare these numbers, it is
nonetheless reassuring that the model yields an increasing proportion of each gender going to college as
a function of aptitude as this was the case in the NLSY79 data. While we do not have a formal proof
that the welfare gap between college and high school is increasing in aptitude level, a simple two period
version of the model yields h   l > 0 as a sucient condition for a monotonically increasing response
in aptitude (), which is satised in the data.63
The quantitative model allows us to evaluate the welfare costs of divorce for women and men by
education level. Given that divorced women retain sole custody of the children, they suer a large drop
in consumption upon the dissolution of marriage. Comparing the average consumption of women who
are married in both periods one and two with women who are married only in period one, the average
consumption of divorced women in period 2 is 18.7% lower than their married counterpart's for college
women and 9.2% smaller for high-school women.
An alternative calculation is the percentage of average consumption a married woman would be
61The variable which denotes the existence and age of the youngest child in the household does not begin until 1968 in
the CPS. For the Census data, we dene women with children under 10 as those who report the existence of an own child
under that age in the household.
62After the rst three periods, given the structure of fertility shocks in the model all children would be older than ten.
63To see this, consider a two period version of the model in which, in the rst period agents choose whether to go to
college and in the second the agent consumes her/his earnings. Note that according to our model specication, the wage of
an individual of ability  can be written as we() = we(0)exp(e (   0)) where 0 is some given base ability level. Next,
let C denote the cost of college. We want to show
@C
@ > 0: Using CRRA preferences and assuming wh ()   wl () > 0 (a
necessary condition for individuals to attend college if costs are positive) yields h > l as a sucient condition.
29willing to sacrice in period 2 in order to remain in her married state. This is the ze that solves
u(ze cm
e )     m
e = u( cd
e)     d
e ; (26)
where   s
e denotes the average disutility from labor of working women of education e in marital status s 2
fm;dg. Note that this average includes the disutility of working with children at home. This calculation
yields a consumption loss of 24.6% for a college women and 19.2% for her high-school counterpart. The
smaller gap in consumption loss between education groups comes from their dierences in labor disutility
as this is higher for high-school women, and from the latter's higher marginal utility resulting from lower
consumption.
Men, on the other hand, gain from divorce. Comparing the average consumption (by education) of
men who are married in both periods one and two with men who are married only in period one, the
average consumption of divorced men in period 2 is 21.7% higher than that of their married counterpart's
for college men and 20.9% higher for high-school men. Note that the dierence in consumption gains for
men across the two education levels is signicantly smaller than the gap between college and high-school
women. This is because married women have low LFP rates and thus, on average, the economic
consequences of divorce for men arise mostly from a decrease in household size.64
6 From 1935 to 1955
In this section we investigate the consequences of rst introducing the 1955 family structure on the 1935
benchmark, followed by imposing the 1955 wage structure and lastly the combination of the two. Having
changed the family and economic structures, we then explore the role of preferences. We conclude with
a welfare analysis.
64Peterson (1996) examines the economic consequences of divorce. He nds, using 1976-'77 data, that women's
income-to-needs ratio (using a household-equivalence scale) fell by 27 percent whereas men's increased by 10 percent.
All the literature surveyed by him agrees that the economic consequences of divorce were to make women worse o and
men better o.
306.1 1955 Family Structure
1955 Divorce Rates
In order to gauge the importance of the markedly higher divorce rate faced by 1955 cohort, we start by
examining the impact of these changes on outcomes. To do this, we increase the per period probability
of divorce from the levels faced from the ages of 25 to 44, in 1935 (around 5.5% on average) to the levels
faced in 1955 (around 9.1% on average). A few things to note concerning the divorce probabilities faced
by the 1955 cohort. First, the divorce probabilities faced by the 1955 cohort are, on average, higher
for both genders and education groups. Second, the age prole of the divorce probabilities changes.
Whereas in 1935 the divorce rate is more or less uniform across the ages of 25-44, in 1955 most of the
divorce risk is concentrated in the ages of 25-34.
In this exercise, we hold all other parameters constant at their 1935 levels, including the initial
proportions by marital status, the per period marriage and remarriage rates, and the conditional
probabilities of marrying a college spouse. As one can see from Figure 12, married women's LFP
dramatically increases in the rst two to three periods.65 This reects the much higher divorce risk
faced by women in those periods leading them to work more both to accumulate greater experience and
more assets. Both will improve a woman's welfare if she divorces. The magnitude of the LFP increase
for college women during their rst two periods of work is of around 33 percentage points while that of
high school women is around 28 percentage points.
The increase in divorce probabilities also aects the proportion of men and women who choose
higher education and, most importantly, this eect is asymmetric across genders: there is an almost 2
percentage point increase in the proportion of women who choose to enroll in higher education (29.1%
in the benchmark vs 30.7%) versus a greater than 3 percentage point drop in the proportion of men
who choose to do the same (39.2% vs. 35.9% in this experiment). This conrms our earlier speculation
that increases in the divorce rate worked to decrease the education gap between men and women in a
quantitatively signicant fashion. In particular, had no other forces been at work, the 1955 divorce rate
would have closed almost half (49.0%) of the initial education gender gap.
One can shed light on this asymmetric reaction by noting that a higher divorce risk increases the
incentive for women to work and thus increases a woman's return to a college education in the form of
higher wages. In the case of men, on the other hand, high-school men benet more from divorce than
65There is also an increase in the LFP of divorced women (not shown).
31their college counterparts because they have higher divorce rates and lower remarriage rates.
1955 Marriage Market
Next, we proceed to evaluate the eects of the remaining changes in the marriage market. Using
the 1935 benchmark model, we now change not only the divorce probabilities but also the conditional
probabilities of marrying a spouse of a given education level (i.e., the assortativeness of marriage), the
marriage and remarriage probabilities, and the initial distribution of marital states, all so as to match
the 1955 marriage market.
The changes in female LFP across education and marital status are very similar to the ones obtained
when we changed only the divorce probabilities (shown in Figure 13 with the label \Marriage Market").
The education choices, however, react signicantly more, becoming positive for men as well. The
proportion of men with college goes from 39.2% in the benchmark to 43.6%; for women, the increase
is from 29.1% to 34.0%. This is mostly a result of the increase in the proportion of individuals who
emerge from period zero in a one-person household { either single or divorced. These marital states
have low consumption and low assets. Going to college increases earnings which helps to mitigate the
adverse consequences of this change in initial proportions.
1955 Fertility, Childcare, and Marriage Market
Finally, in addition to the changes in the marriage market, we allow (i) fertility patterns to change, (ii)
childcare costs to decrease by 20%, and (iii) both the preceding changes to happen simultaneously. We
are interested in the eect of childcare costs since Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) conclude
that 50% of the increase in married women's LFP between the cohort born in 1945 and the one born in
1955 is due to a fall in childcare costs of 15%. We investigate a 20% decline in childcare costs in order
to account for the fact that our cohorts are further apart.
We nd that the further changes in education beyond those already attributed to the 1955 marriage
market are relatively small for both experiments (i) and (ii). A larger than linear eect, however, is
achieved when both fertility and childcare costs are changed simultaneously. In that case, although all
women (and men) gain from these changes, high-school women gain by more and the nal proportion
of women who choose to go to college decreases from the 34.0% achieved in the previous experiment to
32.1%. For men, on the other hand, the combined eect of lower fertility and childcare is to increase
32the relative attractiveness of college mostly because their (college) wives increase their LFP (see Figure
13); 43.9% of them choose to enroll in college.
The changes in LFP resulting from the lower fertility and childcare costs are shown in Figure 13 (the
lines with the caption \MM + children"). Interestingly, they decrease somewhat the LFP of married
high-school women when they are younger (but increase the LFP of married college women), and increase
it thereafter. This decrease in LFP during early working life is mainly because the total number of
children for high school women drops signicantly across the two cohorts (from 3.2 children per woman
to 2.1). This leads to an increase in household consumption which then dampens women's incentives
to work.
To summarize, changes in the marriage market, fertility and childcare costs account for a signicant
fraction of the change in LFP across the two cohorts of married women, especially for those with a
college education. For example, these changes account for 70.6% of the average LFP gap across the two
cohorts of college married women from age 25 to 50 and 60.5% of the average LFP gap for the equivalent
high-school women. Interestingly, they generate too much of an increase in the LFP of divorced high
school women (see Figure 14). With respect to education, these changes can explain almost all of the
increase in the proportion of men who choose college (43.9% in this model versus 44.2% in the data for
1955) whereas for women it can account for 20.6% of the gap between 1935 cohort and 1955 cohort.
6.2 1955 Wage Structure
We next turn to quantifying the contribution of changes in the wage structure. As is commonly
recognized, two key changes in wages that took place in the second half of the 20th century were: (i)
the skill premium increased for both men and women, and (ii) the ratio of female to male wages also
increased. Quantifying the eect of these changes, given the endogeneity of the ability distribution in
each education category and women's selection into work, requires changing certain parameters which
govern wages, in particular the eg;t which discipline the time path of wages. Recall that the rst
dierences of the sequence of fem;tgt=2;:::;tR for men were calculated directly from wage data for each
cohort. The ones calculated for the years corresponding to the 1955 cohort (see Figure 8) will now
be used for this experiment. That leaves us with the sequences of fef;tgt=1;:::;tR for women which we
calibrate internally in order to match certain wage statistics as described below. The returns to ability,
the parameters for the stochastic process, and the returns to experience for men, on the other hand are
33left at their 1935 values.66
1955 Skill Premia and Gender Gap
We now proceed to investigate the eects of the 1955 wage gender ratios and skill premia for both
genders. To do this we use the sequences of fef;tgt=1;:::;T for women to match the period-by-period
gender wage ratio and skill premia for women.67
As shown in Figure 15 in the graph with the caption \Skill Premium + Gender Gap", these changes
in wage structure result in signicant LFP changes for college women (almost a 10 percentage point
average increase across the life-cycle) and somewhat smaller increase for high-school women (6 percentage
points). The increase in female LFP is fairly uniform across most periods, as contrasted with the eect of
divorce which increased LFP primarily in the rst few work periods. College becomes signicantly more
attractive both for women and men, with 35.7% of women choosing it compared to 47.2% of men. Both
men and women respond to the increased skill premia by becoming more educated, but men respond
more strongly largely as a result of their greater labor market participation which increases the returns
from college.
1955 Returns to Experience
Given that the literature in this eld has found that an increase in the returns to experience for women
increased their LFP (see footnote 44 for a discussion), an additional exercise is to compound the changes
in the wage structure above (increased skill premia and gender wage ratio) with a higher returns to
experience. We do this by changing the parameters ef1;ef2 to 0.1593 and -0.003, respectively, so that
an extra year of experience translates to a 3% increase in wages for the 1955 cohort (relative to the 2%
for the 1935 cohort), a reasonable number given Olivetti's (2006) nding, using the 1970 Census, of a
3-5% return to working full-time for an additional year.68
As seen in Figure 15 in the graph labelled \All Wages", the higher returns to experience results in
married women working more when young, with a more prolonged eect for high-school women. It has
66Recall that we estimated the returns to ability and the parameters for the stochastic process using NLSY79 data
because we do not have specic data pertaining to each of our two cohorts. We maintain the returns to experience for men
unchanged as these were estimated from the data as pure age/experience eects, after controlling for year eects.
67Note that in the data average real lifetime wages for men are unchanged between these two cohorts. However, an
increase in the gender wage ratio introduces a level eect. Given that we have a non-homothetic model, it is not clear that
one should eliminate all level eects as this would imply that the disutility of labor is proportional to income.
68In the robustness checks we experimented with 5% returns to experience with very similar results.
34basically no eect on married women's LFP once they are older. The proportions of college men and
women also increases minutely (less than 0.4 percentage points).
1955 Wage and Family Structure
Combining all the changes in wage structure from the previous section with the changes in family
structure from section 6.1, we obtain the LFP path for married women shown in the graph in Figure 15
labelled \wages + family". Except for the rst and second periods, married women's LFP is still below
the levels in the data for women of both education groups in the 1955 cohort. The changes in family
structure, when layered on top of the changes in wage structure, impacts LFP mostly during fertility
years for both married high school and college women, with an additional smaller eect later in life for
the former. The early life increase in LFP is particularly strong for college women, so much so that
LFP during the ages of 25-29 (period 1) implied by the model is 6 percentage points higher than the
value in the data for the 1955 cohort.
The changes in wage and family structures combined can account for over three quarters of the
average LFP gap between the two cohorts during the ages of 30-49 for married women of both education
groups. The eect of these changes for divorced women is shown in Figure 16. As shown in the gure,
the predicted change is so large that both education groups work more than in the data.
It is important to note that the combination of family and wage changes are not able to explain the
education gap. Although the proportion of women in college increases by a large amount { from 29.1%
to 38.7% { so that they are much closer to the 1955 data point of 43.7%, men's college proportion also
increases by 10 percentage points (from 39.2% to 49.5%) leading a 5 percentage point over-prediction
with respect to the data and to the same 10 percentage point education gender gap that existed earlier.
Thus, we next turn to examining the role of education costs and preferences in explaining the remaining
LFP gap for married women, the too high LFP for divorced women, and the failure to account for the
education gender gap.
6.3 Preferences
It is dicult to deny that social attitudes towards women changed dramatically over the lives of the
two cohorts. Rather than treat preference changes as a residual that explains the remaining LFP gap,
we investigate whether a simple change in work preferences is able to account for it. Prior to this, we
35examine the changes required in education cost in order to match the education outcomes in the data.
The Psychic Cost of College
As noted previously, the combination of all the 1955 changes generated too large a proportion of college
men and too small a proportion of college women. We now recalibrate the model to include not only
the changes in family and wage structure but also any change in education costs required to generate
the college proportions seen in the data.
Performing the exercise above yields new means for the distributions of psychic costs of f = 0:5540
and m = 1:2146. This translates into a decrease in female average education costs of 28.1% whereas
male education costs increase by a similar proportion (30.6%). The predicted LFP rates for women of
every education and marital status are very similar to the ones obtained without the change in education
cost and hence are not shown here.69
How can one interpret the fact that the model requires an asymmetric reaction by gender on education
costs? One way to think about the changed education costs is that they combine an increase in monetary
costs for both genders (as has been well-documented in the literature) with a suciently large decrease
in women's psychic cost of college so as to undo the economic increase in costs.70 As argued by
Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko (2006), girls may have a lower nonpecuniary cost of college preparation
and attendance than boys. They point to the fact that at the turn of last century females graduated
high school at a higher rate than males, mimicking what is found today for college graduation rates.
They advance the hypothesis, which accords with our nding of a higher psychic cost for men, that boys
may have a lower level of non-cognitive skills (e.g. they higher incidence of behavioral problems) leading
them to be less prepared, on average, to attend college. Thus, the decrease in female psychic costs may
simply reect their true lower value once discrimination is removed.
69Across all our experiments, the additional change in LFP that comes from the changed ability compositions across
education groups is miniscule.
70Although the literature has also found that changing family background (i.e. more parents being college educated) has
led to changes in the non-pecuniary costs of education, there is no reason for this to aect genders asymmetrically.
36Work Preferences
There exists a growing literature that demonstrates the importance of culture for various outcomes
including female LFP.71 Given that changes in education costs, wage, and family structures are not able
to fully account for the changes in the female LFP that took place between the 1935 and 1955 cohorts,
we now ask whether changes in preferences (cultural change) towards work are able to explain the gaps
between predicted LFP and the data.72
Unfortunately, there is little quantitative evidence to discipline how preferences should be changed.73
In light of this we will ask whether a simple proportional decrease of 10% in all married women's work
disutilities is able to generate the work behavior observed in the data. In addition to this change,
given that the model is over-predicting the LFP of divorced women, we will assume that the preferences
of the latter now resemble those of their married counterparts. Why should this be the case? One
plausible argument is that once divorce became much more common { an experience that any woman
might encounter { the typical divorced woman no longer belonged to some selected pool in terms of her
preferences and instead had the same average preferences as those prevalent in her education group.
The left panel of Figure 17 plots the model's predictions for the LFP of married women by education
and the right panel does the same for the LFP of divorced women. As can be seen in the resulting
graphs, this simple change in preferences does a remarkable job in generating LFP series that are very
close to the data. We conclude that the combination of changes in economic environment and family
structure in conjunction with a very simple change in female work preferences can account for basically
all the changes in female LFP across cohorts. To account for the changes in education, however, requires
an asymmetric reaction by gender in the cost of education as explained previously.
6.4 Welfare
How did women and men in the 1955 cohort fare relative to their 1935 counterparts? We will answer
this question in a few steps. First, we keep education xed at the levels obtained after changing the
economic environment, family structure, and college costs to reect those in 1955 (i.e. as obtained in
71See Fern andez and Fogli (2009) for the inuence of culture on female LFP and Fern andez (2010) for an overview of this
literature.
72An alternative to interpreting the changes in   as resulting from preference change is to attribute them to technological
change that made it easier for women to work outside the home (e.g. washing machines as in Greenwood, Seshadri, and
Yorukoglu (2005) or in brain-biased technological change as in Rendall (2010)).
73See Fern andez (2011) for a calibrated learning model of female LFP that makes use of longitudinal poll evidence to
govern how preferences evolved.
37section 6.3) but keeping female work preferences unchanged from the 1935 benchmark. Second, we
allow preferences to change. Lastly, we do a full-edged ex ante welfare analysis.
Given the the distribution of agents into college and high school implied by the 1955 model and after
they have sunk their college costs, we can ask whether agents were better o in the 1955 environment or
in the 1935 environment. To do this, we nd the proportion z by which consumption across all states
would have to be scaled such that, conditional on education and gender, expected utility in 0 = 1955 is























0 () is the proportion of agents of ability  and gender g that have education level e in 1955.
EVegt (z;;0) is the expected utility in period t of an agent of gender g, education e, and ability , given
that her/his consumption level in each possible state is multiplied by z and that she/he faces the 1955
environment. A z greater than 1 indicates that agents were better o in 1935 than in 1955.
Conditional on education, we nd a sharp gender divide in how agents fared. Women of both
education levels were made worse o from living in the 1955 environment relative to the 1935 one. Men,
on the other hand, were made better o across education levels. In consumption equivalent terms z,
college women in 1955 would require a 0.5% increase in all consumption levels to leave them indierent
between 1955 and 1935 whereas high school women would require a larger increase of 2.7%. Both college
and high school men, however, would need large decreases in consumption levels in order to be indierent
between the two cohort structures. College men in 1955 would require a 10.9% decrease in all levels
of consumption whereas high-school men would be willing to suer a 4.1% decrease. The asymmetry
across genders stems from the fact that men were made better o from the change in family structure,
particularly the increase in divorce probabilities, whereas women lost from the same change. For both
genders, the relative welfare gains from 1955 are greater for college than for high school individuals.
This is mainly a result of the increased skill premium for both genders.
Next we allow female preferences toward work to change as in section 6.3, in addition to the other
changes in the economic and family structures. Female work preferences in 1935 are kept at their
original values. We nd that the change in preferences for work improves women's welfare suciently
such that college women now prefer the 1955 environment. High school women, however, are still worse
o. College women in 1955 would now be required to decrease their consumption across all states by
382.5% in order to be indierent between 1955 and 1935; high school women, on the other hand, would
require a 1.9% increase in order to be indierent. For men there are additional gains from the change
in female work preferences as their wives now work more. College men in 1955 would require a 17.0%
decrease in consumption whereas high-school men would need a 5.5% decrease in order to be indierent.
It is important to understand that these conditional statements do not take into account the welfare
gains generated from the large increase in women's educational attainment. In order to do that, we
need to perform an ex ante welfare analysis, not condition on education, and take into account the cost
of college. Hence, we now condition only on gender and nd z such that the expected utility of being
gender g is the same in 1935 as in 1955, taken into that the education costs for 1955, !(0) are not the

























Note that this expression takes into account the fact that the proportion of individuals in college was






The ex ante welfare analysis indicates that all agents gained from the 1955 environment (both with
and without changes in female work preferences). With changed preferences, women in 1955 would
require a 5.4% decrease in consumption across all states in order to be indierent between the 1955
environment and the 1935 environment; men would require a 14.7% decrease. Not surprisingly given
the preceding analysis, the gain for men from 1955 relative to 1935 is considerably larger than that for
women.74
7 Robustness Checks
In this section we discuss the robustness of our model's main ndings to alternative values of parameters
whose empirical foundations are less well grounded.
A key parameter that governs the welfare of wives versus husbands is the Pareto weight  used to
obtain a solution to the married household's allocation problem. We chose  = 0:3, implying that the
wife had lower bargaining power than her husband. Another plausible choice would have been  = 0:5,
74If female work preferences are not allowed to change, women in 1955 would require a 3.4% decrease in consumption
levels whereas men would require an 12.1% decrease.
39where husband and wife receive equal weight in the household allocation problem. With this in mind,
we recalibrate the benchmark 1935 model using  = 0:5.
While most wages parameters remain similar (albeit slightly higher), all parameters for disutility
from labor become smaller than they were in the original benchmark in order to explain why women
worked as much as they did. Repeating the experiment of changing only divorce probabilities to those
for the 1955 cohort (see beginning of section 6.1), we nd equivalent results although the reactions are
slightly more muted. As before, the response in LFP to increased divorce remain concentrated on their
rst periods of working life. While in the original benchmark the increase in LFP during the ages of
25-34 was around 30 percentage points for both college and high school, those same statistics are now
around 20 and 15 percentage points, respectively. With respect to education choices, the responses
are similar (albeit a bit smaller than in the original benchmark). The recalibrated model also yields
the same implications as the original benchmark when we redo the experiment in which we change all
wage and family structures (see end of section 6.2), although, once again, the eects are smaller. These
changes now account for around 58% of the LFP gap between the two cohorts of married women.
Next we can investigate whether a change in women's bargaining power can help explain the cohort
changes. This is motivated by research that argues that, given the changes in female wages, woman's
bargaining power within the household has increased over time. For example, Knowles (2007a) nds
that  = 0:34 in 1970 but due to rise in wages of women this value increased to  = 0:41 in the 1990s.
Since we chose  = 0:3 for 1955 as well, this possibly underestimates the bargaining power of the wife
then. Below we explore the eect of compounding all wage and family structure changes as in section
6.3 with an increased Pareto weight of the wife to  = 0:5.
A feature of any simple model with disutility of labor for women is that an increase in the wife's
Pareto weight will, ceteris paribus, lower her participation rate. This is indeed what happens in this
model. Compared to our specication in which we change wages and family structure, the average
lifetime LFP of married college women drops by 10 percentage points from 71.3% to 62.7% and their
high school counterparts' participation is 12 percentage points lower (from 63.7% to 49.6%), although
their life cycle participation proles remain for the most part higher than the ones seen for the 1935
cohort. The labor supply of divorced women during their youth is also lower than in the specication
with  = 0:3 as they take into account the possibility of future marriage and decreased participation.
With respect to education decisions and comparing with the specication with  = 0:3, fewer women
choose to go to college (34.7%). The proportion of men who choose to go to college is almost unaected,
40with a drop of less than 0.5 percentage points.
Additional robustness checks included changing the proportion of a man's income which must be
paid in child support and in pension support for ex wives. We recalibrated the model for 5% and 20% of
income. The parameter values implied by these alternative proportions are generally similar to the ones
implied by the benchmark model and the eects on labor and education decisions across the dierent
experiments were also very similar.
Finally, given that we did not have rm evidence as to the proportion of household assets obtained
by a wife upon divorce, we recalibrate the model with asset splits of  = 0:3 and  = 0:7. Implied labor
disutility parameters are generally lower than the benchmark in the former and higher in the latter. The
experiments on these recalibrated benchmarks also yielded similar results as the original benchmark.75
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper developed a dynamic stochastic life-cycle model to evaluate how changes in family structure,
economic environment, and cultural norms contributed to changes in the education choices and women's
LFP. The model was calibrated to match key statistics of the 1935 cohort. We then proceeded to
change characteristics of the environment in order to approach the one faced by the 1955 cohort. The
model was successful in predicting increased LFP for women, accounting for over three quarters of the
LFP gap of married women between the ages of 30-49. However, the model also implied that preferences
towards work and education needed to have evolved in order to fully account for the changes in LFP
across the two cohorts and the closing of the education gender gap.
We found both changes in the family and wage structure important in explaining the prole of
women's work. Each in isolation is able to account for a large proportion (60%) of the observed changes
in female LFP. The increased probability of divorce faced by the 1955 cohort, in particular, is a key driver
of the increase in women's work and it produced the desired asymmetric reaction in the education choices
of men and women, helping to reduce the education gender gap signicantly. Furthermore, changes
in divorce probabilities alone account for around 60% of the LFP increase during the ages of 25-40 for
married women. The changes in wage structure, however, particularly the increased skill premium for
men, undo a large part of the elimination of the education gender gap and thus ultimately required an
asymmetric change in education costs to match the data for the 1955 cohort. Thus it is fair to say
75All results from the robustness checks are available upon request.
41that both the asymmetric nature of the economic consequences of divorce and the asymmetric change in
education costs are required to produce the much more symmetric work and education outcomes across
the sexes.
The model also had interesting welfare predictions. Conditional on education level, men greatly
beneted from the changing economic environment, whereas both high school and college women lost
from those changes. However, once we allow female preferences for work to change, college women also
enjoyed small welfare gains in the 1955 world. High-school women on the other hand remained worse o.
An ex ante welfare analysis (i.e., unconditional on education) revealed that both women and men fared
better in 1955. Men's welfare gains, however, are substantially larger than those of women reecting,
in large part, the asymmetric gender costs of divorce.
This paper points to the importance of changes in marital status as a driver of education and women's
LFP. While the paper takes a signicant rst step by incorporating interactions between family structure,
education, and work choices in a dynamic life-cycle setting, much work remains to be done. In the future,
it may also be important to endogenize marriage, divorce, and women's bargaining power.
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Note: Census data from 1940 to 2000 and American Community Survey data from 2009. Sample includes all
white men and women, between the ages of 34 and 36. People with at least some college education are those
with at least 1 year of college. Those with high school are dened as people with a high school diploma or no
more than 12 years of education.
















Note: Census data from 1900 to 2000 and American Community Survey data from 2009. Sample includes all
married white women, between the ages of 34 and 36, not living in group quarters. The proportion plotted
corresponds to those who report being in the labor force.



















Note: Current Population Survey data from 1962-2008. Each birth cohort is dened as a 3 year interval centered
around the cohort birth year, e.g. those who belong in the 1965 cohort are all women born between 1964 and
1966. Figure plots the proportion of all white married women by birth cohort, not living in group quarters, who
report being in the labor force.
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Note: Survey of Income and Program Participation 2004. The gure plots the proportion of marriages (whites
only) that end in divorce as a function of the number of years married, for marriages initiated in each given 10
year interval.
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25-ﾭ‐29	 ﾠ 30-ﾭ‐34	 ﾠ 35-ﾭ‐39	 ﾠ 40-ﾭ‐44	 ﾠ 45-ﾭ‐49	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Note: Current Population Survey 1962-2008. LFP for each birth cohort is dened as all white women born in
a 3 year interval around the birth cohort year, who report being in the labor force. \Married" is dened as
as \married, with spouse present"; \Divorced" is dened as either \divorced" or \separated". See Figure 1 for
education level denitions.
50Figure 6: Timeline for periods 0 and 1 of agent's life














ct,a ¯ t+1,P t
↑
Marital Shock
a¯ t+1 → at+1
↓
• Time 0:
– Draw ability parameter θi ∈ {1,2,3,4,5} where each number is the mean AFQT score in each of the
quintiles of the AFQT89 score distribution in the NLSY79.
– Draw cost of college from a gender speciﬁc distribution: LN(µg,1)
– Choose College or Not
– Get matched: Married (to whom) or single. Husband and wife’s education are correlated (probabilities
given by data) and within each education category, match randomly by ability.
• Time 1 onwards:
– If married, choose ct (household public consumption) and wife’s participation Pt.
– If single female, choose consumption/savings and participation. If single male, only consumption savings
decision.
• DIVORCE (d) and REMARRIAGE (r) and NEW MARRIAGE (m) probabilities at the end of each working
period.
If divorce, split assets where α is the proportion of assets that go to the woman.
Also, if divorced, must stay single for at least one period.
Women get the children.
• Retirement: t = 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
– Retirement pension: calculate average monthly earnings throughout lifetime. Then, replacement rates
are:
1. up to 38% of average individual earnings: replacement rate of 90%
2. from 38% to 159% of average earnings: replacement rate of 32%
3. above 159%: replacement rate of 15%
1











































51Figure 9: Proportion of each gender-education group in each
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 ﾠ Divorce	 ﾠ
Note: Current Population Survey. Sample consists of all white men and women in each birth cohort. See Figure
5 for denitions of married and divorced; \Single" is dened as \never married". See Figure 1 for education
denition.
Figure 10: LFP for married and divorced women by education and age
















Note:  = data. (; ) = model predictions
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25-ﾭ‐29	 ﾠ 30-ﾭ‐34	 ﾠ 35-ﾭ‐39	 ﾠ 40-ﾭ‐44	 ﾠ 45-ﾭ‐49	 ﾠ 50-ﾭ‐54	 ﾠ 55-ﾭ‐59	 ﾠ
Age	 ﾠ
Married	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠSchool	 ﾠWomen	 ﾠ
1955	 ﾠData	 ﾠ












25-ﾭ‐29	 ﾠ 30-ﾭ‐34	 ﾠ 35-ﾭ‐39	 ﾠ 40-ﾭ‐44	 ﾠ 45-ﾭ‐49	 ﾠ 50-ﾭ‐54	 ﾠ 55-ﾭ‐59	 ﾠ
Age	 ﾠ
Married	 ﾠCollege	 ﾠWomen	 ﾠ
1955	 ﾠData	 ﾠ
1935	 ﾠData	 ﾠ
Model,	 ﾠ1955	 ﾠDiv	 ﾠRates	 ﾠ









25-ﾭ‐29	 ﾠ 30-ﾭ‐34	 ﾠ 35-ﾭ‐39	 ﾠ 40-ﾭ‐44	 ﾠ 45-ﾭ‐49	 ﾠ 50-ﾭ‐54	 ﾠ 55-ﾭ‐59	 ﾠ
Age	 ﾠ
Married	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠSchool	 ﾠWomen	 ﾠ
1955	 ﾠData	 ﾠ











25-ﾭ‐29	 ﾠ 30-ﾭ‐34	 ﾠ 35-ﾭ‐39	 ﾠ 40-ﾭ‐44	 ﾠ 45-ﾭ‐49	 ﾠ 50-ﾭ‐54	 ﾠ 55-ﾭ‐59	 ﾠ
Age	 ﾠ
Married	 ﾠCollege	 ﾠWomen	 ﾠ
1955	 ﾠData	 ﾠ
MM	 ﾠ+	 ﾠChildren	 ﾠ
1935	 ﾠData	 ﾠ
Marriage	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠ
Notes: \Marriage Market" = Benchmark model with changes in the marriage market. \MM+Children" = benchmark model with all
changes in family structure
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Notes: \1955 Div" = Benchmark model with changes in the divorce probabilities, \MM + Children" = benchmark model with all
changes in family structure
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56Table 1: Divorce and remarriage rates after 20 years by gender, education, and cohort.
Women Men
HS College HS College
1935 Cohort
Divorce 19.81 16.74 23.94 18.21
Remarriage 87.62 86.06 87.61 91.27
1955 Cohort
Divorce 38.22 36.53 40.79 31.31
Remarriage 86.75 85.46 85.86 92.18
Notes: SIPP 2004. Divorce rates are calculated as the proportion of rst marriages which end in divorce before
the 20th wedding anniversary. Remarriage rates are calculated as the proportion of people who remarry before
they reach the 20th anniversary of their rst divorce. Birth cohorts are dened as people born in a ve year
interval centered on the year of the birth cohort. See Figure 1 for education denitions.
Table 2: Proportions of marriages to college spouse conditional on own gender and education, by
cohort.
College Spouse
1935 Cohort 1955 Cohort
College Woman 75.20 78.41
HS Woman 21.39 29.21
College Man 59.72 74.06
HS Man 12.07 24.24
Note: CPS. The proportions of individuals with college spouse are
calculated for married people between the ages of 35-39, by gender
and education, in each 3 year birth cohort.
57Table 3: External Parameters
Parameter Value
Micro estimates of Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution  1.5
Discount Factor  0.90
Risk Free Interest Rate R 1.16
Regression log wage on age and age2, HS men
lm1 0.1650
lm2 -0.00308
Regression log wage on age and age2, College men
hm1 0.2276
hm2 -0.00285
Gradient of log AFQT scores on log wage, by educ.
l 0.11157
h 0.11874
Returns to experience, women
ef1 0.1041
ef2 -0.003
Persistence of wage residuals, by educ.
l 0.90037
h 0.86546
Std. Dev. of transitory error of wage residuals,by educ.
l 0.10787
h 0.07653
Std. Dev. of persistent error of wage residuals, by educ.
l 0.02850
h 0.03417
Time varying log wage intercepts, men
flm;tgt=2;tR see Figure 7
fhm;tgt=2;tR
Probability of divorce, remarriage and rst marriage fdeg;t;reg;t;meg;tgt=1;:::4 see Tables 6, 7, 8
Table 4: Disutility of labor parameters,  em(k)
Married Married Divorced Divorced
with Child with Child
Parameter values
High School 0.0840 0.2233 0.0962 0.1182
College 0.0420 0.0959 0.0448 0.0667
Consumption equivalence
High School 11.1% 33.6% 12.7% 15.9%
College 5.3% 12.7% 5.7% 8.6%
The consumption equivalence numbers give the fraction of average consumption of a married woman of eduation e that a woman of
the same education level would be willing to sacrice in order to avoid the disutility of labor associated with a particular marital and
fertility state. See text for exact calculation.
58Table 5: Parameters Calibrated Internally
Parameter 1935 Bench
Disutility of labor for women  s
e(kt) see Table 4
Childcare costs for children aged 0-4 and 5-9
young 1.1450
old 0.4029
Initial intercept log wages for men, by education
lm;1 0.0841
hm;1 0.6128
Time varying log wage intercepts, women
flf;tgt=1;tR see Figure 7
fhf;tgt=1;tR




Moments Data 1935 Bench
LFP of married women, by age and education (14) see Fig 5 see Fig 10
LFP of divorced women, by age and education (14) see Fig 5 see Fig 10
Proportion of women who go to college 29.05 29.05
Proportion of men who go to college 39.24 39.24
Skill Premium by age, women (7) see Fig 11 see Fig 11
Ratio of male to female wages by age (7) see Fig 11 see Fig 11
Skill Premium (lifetime), men 1.43 1.43
Table 6: Transition probabilities from single to rst marriage
Men Women
age College High School College High School
1935 Cohort
30 51.24 44.19 18.14 41.01
35 26.06 18.90 19.52 3.84
40 22.65 15.91 23.64 5.63
45 17.32 6.18 1.63 1.00
1955 Cohort
30 41.89 32.27 41.26 21.84
35 33.17 11.42 24.39 14.99
40 21.78 21.28 18.91 15.52
45 24.68 9.48 14.35 2.28
Note: CPS 1962-2008. Probabilities are calculated using the evolution of the proportion of people who are \never
married" between the age shown and 5 years before. These probabilities are conditional on being single.
59Table 7: Per period divorce probabilities
d1 d2 d3 d4
1935 Cohort
Men
HS 5.87 8.60 8.49 6.44
College 6.45 6.03 4.67 5.67
Women
HS 5.39 4.93 5.34 5.38
College 3.44 3.84 4.62 5.46
1955 Cohort
Men
HS 18.04 11.60 7.85 4.70
College 17.42 9.17 5.65 5.06
Women
HS 14.48 9.90 5.36 3.61
College 13.99 9.90 6.17 2.93
Note: d1 refers to ages 25-29, d2 to ages 30-34, d3 to ages 35-39 and d4 to ages 40-44.
These numbers were derived using 2004 SIPP data. See text for details about their
calculation.
Table 8: Per period remarriage probabilities
Women Men
HS College HS College
1935 Cohort 38.84 38.49 37.23 42.48
1955 Cohort 36.11 35.38 35.21 40.18
Note: These numbers were derived using 2004 SIPP data as reported in the text and
assuming a uniform probability of remarriage. See text for details about their calculation.
Table 9: Proportion of women who are mothers during the ages of 25-29,
by cohort, education and marital status
Single Married Divorced
1935 Cohort
High School 8.22 90.81 62.46
College 2.07 90.98 43.14
1955 Cohort
High School 10.39 81.25 52.37
College 3.70 59.87 32.59
Note: CPS 1962-2008. Proportion of women between the ages of 25-29 who report having at least one own child
in the household.










Hourly wages used for the skill premium and the gender wage ratios are computed from the CPS using
the individuals' reported labor income and hours and weeks worked last year. We use the sample of
white men and women who do not live in group quarters. Prior to 1977, for hours per week, we use
the variable which reports the hours worked in the previous week, by intervals; we use the midpoint of
the interval. From 1977 onwards, we use the variables for \usual hours worked per week" (last year)
and the continuous variable for number of weeks worked last year. Whenever we compute lifetime
averages for a variable, we rst compute the average of the variable over each year and then average
across years. Sample weights are used throughout (PERWT). Concerning top-coded observations, we
follow the procedure in Katz and Autor (1999). We multiply all top-coded observations until 1996 by
1.5. After 1996, top-coded observations in the CPS correspond to the average value of all top-coded
observations, thus we do not impose further treatment. We compute the gender wage ratio as the
ratio of the average wage of women versus men. The skill premium is computed analogously, using the
average wage of college versus high school.
A.2 Income Process
lnyeg = eg;t + eg1xt + eg2x2
t + e ln   (1   Pt 1) + wet
wet = zet + et;   N(0;2
;e)
zet = eze;t 1 + et;   N(0;2
;e)
Age Proles and Ability Level Gradients:
We construct an hourly wage measure from NLSY79 data by dividing total earnings by total hours
worked the previous calendar year, deated by CPI-U into 1992 dollars. We use only white men who
have nished their education and we exclude people who change their highest grade completed after
the age of 25. Using the highest grade completed variable, we divide individuals into the two education
groups: people with 12 years of schooling or less (e = l) and people with more than 12 years of completed
schooling(e = h).
62Individuals with missing or top-coded earnings in at least one year are dropped from the sample;
those people who report being unemployed, out of the labor force or in the military are also dropped. We
keep only observations with positive earnings, and we further drop observations in which the individual
worked less than 400 or more than 5840 hours. We further drop individuals who report real wages below
$1 and above $400, in 1992 dollars, and those who have changes in log earnings greater than 4 and less
than -2. We are left with 1852 individuals in the low education group and 449 in the high education
group.
The coecients on age earning proles for men, em1;em2 and the ability gradient e are computed
using data from the NLSY79. We use an individual's AFQT89 score as a measure for . In order to
estimate the ability gradient e we regress the log wage on the log of the individual's AFQT89 score
under the assumption that the error term is uncorrelated with this score. e is estimated separately for
each education group e = fl;hg.
Estimates of the Labor Shock Processes:
Given the residuals from the regression of log wages on age and ability gradients using the NLSY79
data, we estimate the parameters for the persistent and transitory shocks using the Minimum Distance
Estimator (Chamberlain (1984)). The methods of estimating this process are standard in the literature
(see e.g. Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2004) for a detailed description of the method). Note
that we allow for time-varying 2
;e and 2
;e during the estimation process. In the model, we use as
inputs the average value across the sample and this is what we report.
Time-Changing Wage Intercepts:
In order to estimate the time-varying age intercepts for men em;t we use the pooled sample of PSID for
the years 1968-2009, restricted to white males who are heads of households. We exclude individuals in the
Latino, SEO and immigrant samples. We also drop observations from people younger than 25 and people
older than 65 years old and those who report being self-employed. We choose only individuals with
at least 8 (not necessarily consecutive) observations. Furthermore, we drop individuals with missing,
top-coded and zero earnings those with zero, missing or more than 5840 annual work hours. Individuals
with changes in log earnings greater than 4 or less than -2 are also eliminated from the sample. This
leaves us with 1645 individuals in the "low" education group and 1261 in the "high" education group.
In order to account for the fact that the PSID does not include information on an individual's
63ability, we use rst-dierenced earnings in the estimation; note that this implies that we recover only
rst dierences in em;t. We run the following regression separately by education:
lnyPSID
em;s   [^ em1(ages   ages 1)   ^ em2(age2
s   age2
s 1)] = Dem;s + em;s
where the left hand side is the log earnings measure free of the age eects estimated from NLSY, and
Dem;t are the dierenced year dummies. The earnings variable is total labor income of the head
deated it to 1992 dollars using CPI for all urban consumers. Education levels are assigned as the
highest grade completed.
In order to obtain a value for each em;t in the model, we average the Dem;s values obtained over the
5 years corresponding to the em;t interval. Recalling that our earliest data is from 1968 (when our 1935
cohort is 33 years old), our assumptions (see footnote 43) imply that em;1 = Dem;1968. We calibrate
em;1 internally. For the 1955 cohort, on the other hand, we are missing the last intercept em;5, since
the cohort is only observed up to the median age of 55 in 2009. We thus assume that em;5 = em;4
A.3 Consumption Deator:
We use an altered McClements scale (e(kt;s)) in order to deate household consumption. Table 11
reproduces the original McClements scale in normalized for one adult.
Table 11: McClements Scale
+1 child, by age:
1 adult 2 adults + 1 adult 0 - 1 2- 4 5-7 8-10 11-12 13-15 16-18
1 1.64 +0.75 + 0.148 +0.295 + 0.344 +0.377 +0.41 +0.443 +0.59
Since we have 5 year periods, and our children are aged 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-20, we weigh the scale
accordingly. For example, a child aged 0-4 will add: 0:4(0:148) + 0:6(0:295) = 0:2362.
The scale e(kt;s) is constructed using the number of adults in the household (1 if s = S;D and 2 if
s = M) and the number of children and their respective ages (kt).
64A.4 Pensions:
To compute retirement benets for a model household, we modify the approach used in Heathcote,
Storesletten and Violante (2010) in order to avoid keeping track of an individual's average earnings over
their life-cycle. More specically, we take each individual's last observed earnings yT and compute social
security benets as follows: 90% of yT up to a rst threshold equal to 0:38 yT, where  yT is the average
observed earnings in the economy during the last period, plus 32% of yT from this bend-point to a higher
bend-point equal to 1:59 yT, plus 15% of the remaining yT exceeding this last bend-point. For married
households, this process is done for both the husband and the wife; the household total benets are
either the sum of their benets or 1.5 times the husband's benets, whichever one is highest.
B Appendix: Model Solution
In our model, households have a nite horizon, so the dynamic problem is solved numerically by
backwards recursion from the last period of life. At each age, the households solve for their consumption
savings rule and participation decisions taking as given their state variables that period and next period's
value function. In addition to assets, our model has four other potential continuous state variables: the
persistent components of earnings wem
t and of the wife, w
ef
t and the ability draws of the husband m
and of the wife f. Handling more than one continuous state variable is possible but computationally
costly. We discretize these four variables, leaving assets as our only continuous state. We choose 10
nodes whose locations are age-dependent for each of the earnings components and the quintiles of ability
distribution outlined in the main text.
During the working stages of the life-cycle, our model combines a discrete decision (whether the
woman participates in the market) and a continuous decision (the amount of savings). This combination
may lead to non-concavities in the value function. Furthermore, the existence of transitions across
marital states also requires some attention as explained below.
For all periods t > 4, since there are no longer any transitions across dierent marital status, the
maximization problem for the single men and women and divorced men is a straightforward consumption-savings
problem. The problem of the married couple and of the divorced woman combines the discrete
participation choice of the wife together with the continuous choice of assets. The combination implies
that concavity of the value function is not guaranteed even if one controls for the participation decision
that period. Given enough uncertainty the value function conditional on today's participation is concave
65We follow Attanasio et al. (2008) and impose (and check) a unique level of reservation assets a
t at which,
given the values of all other state variables, the conditional value functions intersect only once and thus
the woman's participation decision switches at that point from not working to working. We numerically
check both the concavity of the conditional value functions and the uniqueness of the reservation asset
level.
The optimization problem of the household who enters a period t  4 as a married couple must take
into account the continuation values of the husband and wife, which are dierent. It's important to note
that the solution of the optimization problem for the divorced and single (men and women) involves the
calculation of a xed point. Given that each individual has perfect information about their potential
spouses' contemporaneous state variables, she/he will solve her/his own optimization problem taken as
given their potential spouses' asset allocation for next period.
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